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INTRODUCTION 
Regional environmental governance is essential to remediate 
transboundary environmental harm. 1  Establishing regional environmental 
governance abrogates tensions and complexities of harm arising from diverse 
economic development in Asia-Pacific countries.2 Additionally, Asia-Pacific 
countries have unequal environmental standards stipulated in their domestic 
laws and regulations. Their confusing environmental standards likely result 
in conflicts across the region. These inconsistent environmental standards, 
along with potential disputes—such a sensitive field and confrontational 
phenomenon—further complicate the process to establish regional 
environmental governance in Asia-Pacific. On a multilateral level, the debate 
on the linkage of trade liberalization and environmental protection at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) continues. In particular, four out of the 
total nine environmental disputes in the WTO and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) occurred in Asia-Pacific.3 These disputes indicate 
the significance of establishing regional environmental governance in Asia-
Pacific, not only to handle transboundary environmental harm but also to 
prevent environmentally-related trade disputes. 
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional forum that 
focuses on trade and economic issues and carries out regional environmental 
governance. APEC member economies operate on open regionalism. This 
voluntary and non-binding scheme, however, has caused obstacles for APEC 
to protect the environment. The main factor underlying this difficulty is the 
complicated geopolitics in Asia-Pacific. APEC’s environmental protection 
objective derives from the nature of transboundary environmental matters,                                                                                                                                 
 1.  Koh Kheng Lian & Nicholas A. Robinson, Regional Environmental Governance: 
Examining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Model, in GLOBAL ENVTL. 
GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS & OPPORTUNITIES 101, 102 (Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. Ivanova ed., 2002). 
2.   John Davis, Regional Economic Integration, the Environment and Community: East 
Asia and APEC, 17 INT’L REV. OF APPL. ECON. 69, 71 (2003) (listing an array of common 
transboundary environmental problems including water quality and quantity problems from solid and 
toxic wastes from industrial, agricultural, and domestic sectors). 
3.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS/58 (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) (citing the Shrimp-Turtle case 
brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against the U.S); see also Report of the Panel, United 
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO/DS/21 (circulated Sept. 3, 1991) (citing the Tuna-Dolphin 
case brought by Mexico against the U.S.); Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of 
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268 (adopted Mar. 22, 1988) (citing the case concerning measures 
affecting exports of unprocessed herring and salmon brought by U.S. against Canada.); Report of the 
Panel, United States—Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, L/5198 (adopted 
Feb. 22, 1982) (citing the case concerning prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products brought by 
Canada against U.S.).   
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which requires a regional approach to deal with such matters.4 As APEC is 
considered the hub of trade on environmental goods, it recognizes the 
significant development of trade measures aimed towards environmental 
protection in Asia-Pacific.5 
Based on the linkage between trade and the environment in Asia-Pacific, 
this article argues for the necessity of creating regional environmental 
governance by a mega-regional trade agreement (RTA).6 In this article, the 
countries in Asia-Pacific are those twenty-one member economies in APEC.7 
Besides analyzing the regional environmental governance of APEC, this 
article explains why environmental governance in other Asia Pacific regional 
economic forums do not function well. The identified regional economic 
forums include: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
These members overlap with those in APEC. These regional forums lack 
sufficient institutional capacity and arrangements, technical expertise, and 
financial support. Therefore, a mega-RTA is a significant tool to establish 
regional environmental governance. 
This rest of the article is structured as follows. The second section 
examines the linkage between trade and the environment globally and 
regionally in Asia-Pacific. The third section analyzes how APEC implements 
environmental protection. The fourth section evaluates why the 
environmental chapter in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—the successor of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP)—appears to introduce more effective regional 
environmental governance than APEC. However, the CPTPP environmental 
chapter faces rectifiable criticisms. Finally, the article concludes with the 
contemporary challenges and opportunities in international trade and 
environmental law, along with the associated policies and governance in 
Asia-Pacific.                                                                                                                                 
 4.  Davis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 74. 
 5.  Patricia M. Goff, The Environmental Goods Agreement: A Piece of the Puzzle, No. 72 
CIGI PAPERS 2, 2 (June 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.72.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 6.  See Regional trade agreements and the WTO, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_pta_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (adopting 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) to describe free trade agreements between more than two signing 
parties in a specific geographical area. WTO defines RTAs as reciprocal trade agreements between two 
or more partners, including free trade agreements and customs unions). 
 7.  Member Economies, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, https://www.apec.org/about-
us/about-apec/member-economies.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (consisting of Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, China, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, Philippine, Russia, South Korea, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, US, and 
Vietnam).  
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I. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Debate Between Trade Liberalization and Environmental Protection 
Since the 1990s, the WTO has been criticized for giving little concern to 
social issues related to non-tariff barriers to trade,8 including environmental 
protection. 9  The World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization, however, indicated that trade liberalization can improve social 
protections. Increased trade profits can bring general efficiencies with 
benefits to the environment.10 
The WTO’s chief objective is to substantially reduce tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to promote trade liberalization at a multilateral level.11 During 
the final period of the Uruguay Round, between 1986 and 1994, certain 
member states within the WTO sought to expose numerous environmental 
issues. However, the linkage between free trade and the environment is 
complicated. The debate on whether they are mutually beneficial has 
revolved around particular issues.12 While one could advocate free trade as a 
source of economic development, it can also damage the environment 
through increased pollution. 13  If states focus solely on promoting trade 
interests, there is a high possibility that their environmental regulatory 
autonomy could be negatively affected.14 Moreover, trade-supportive policy 
can often lead to environmental harms, such as the examples in Hong Kong 
and the Pearl River Delta during the 1980s and 1990s. 15  The Global                                                                                                                                 
 8.  LORAND BARTELS, SOCIAL ISSUES IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS LABOUR, 
ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, in LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 2–5 (2014), 
reprinted in BILATERAL AND REG’L TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY, ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES 
364 (Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Lorand Bartels eds., 2nd ed. 2015). 
 9.  Id. at 3. 
 10.   WORLD COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION, A FAIR 
GLOBALIZATION: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL, 57–58 (2004), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 11.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (“Recognizing that their relations in 
the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to … while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment . . . .”). 
 12.  Goff, supra note 5, at 2. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.   S. Thomas, The Necessity of Trade-Restrictive Measures Aimed at Protecting the 
Environment 3 (2004) (unpublished master thesis, University of Groningen) (on file with author), cited in 
Firehiwot Wujira, Non-Trade Concerns in Interpreting General Exception Clauses of WTO Agreements, 
4 MIZAN L. REV. 164, 164 (2010).  
 15.   See Christine Loh, Tackling Cross-border Air Quality in Southern China, China 
Environment Series, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 64 (2007), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ces9.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (describing how 
Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta region experienced environmental issues as industrialization grew).    
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Commission on the Economy and Climate Change (Commission), a major 
international initiative, also reported increased pollution after the economic 
development. In 2014, the Commission asserted that globalization has 
resulted in both high- and low-carbon growths over the last 25 years. These 
carbon growths were important economic stimuli for developed and 
developing countries, including emerging economies. Still, carbon growths 
have significantly changed production in countries that have coal-based 
energy systems and less powerful pollution controls. Thus, the trade boom 
has likely increased the amount of global greenhouse gas emissions.16 
Nonetheless, free trade can achieve objectives of environmental 
protection. The “Environmental Kuznets Curve” supports this claim. Kuznets 
hypothesized that a turning point exists in the relationship between 
environmental pollution and trade liberalization when economic profits 
increase to a certain margin.17 Trade liberalization can also help achieve 
environmental goals in other ways. For instance, a positive correlation exists 
between economic development and the responsibility with which states 
pursue environmental protections. Sallie James argues that because trade 
leads to wealth with an increased desire and ability to protect the 
environment, these two areas—trade and environmental protection—are 
complementary. 18  According to the Commission, trade is important to 
accelerate the transmission of low-carbon technologies to countries with low-
cost manufacturing. Trade both reduces cost and increases the geographic 
range, within which these technologies circulate.19 Fundamental economic 
theories, such as comparative advantage, help explain the role that trade has 
played in facilitating low-carbon technologies.20 Economic efficiency gained 
through liberal economic practices can indeed generate positive 
environmental results.21                                                                                                                                  
16.  THE GLOB. COMM’N ON THE ECON. AND CLIMATE CHANGE, BETTER GROWTH BETTER 
CLIMATE: THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT 49 (2014), 
http://static.newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NCE_SynthesisReport.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 17.  Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 20 
(1955) (describing other trends also, like inequality, that change with economic growth). 
 18.  Sallie James, Free Trade is a Boon to the Environment, CATO INST. (Oct. 8, 2009), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/free-trade-is-boon-environment (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).  
 19.  See GLOB. COMM’N ON THE ECON. AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 49 
(increasing global supply chains for solar and wind technology has reduced cost).  
 20.  See ALAN PROFESSOR WINTERS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 13, 21–26 (4th ed. 1991) 
(evaluating the Ricardian model of comparative advantage). 
 21.  See generally JENNIFER CLAPP & PETER DAUVERGNE, PATHS TO A GREEN WORLD: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 177 (The MIT Press 2005) (showing that companies 
become more efficient with less waste created, which, in turn, allows for less environmental issues).  
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Likewise, carefully considering the environment can spur economic 
profits and trade opportunities.22 For developing countries, however, green 
protectionism can prove burdensome. Developing countries must meet 
higher environmental standards, which makes development gains more 
difficult to achieve. Thus, the relationship between trade and the environment 
is complicated, but a positive correlation between these two areas can exist.23  
Tangible institutional efforts to make this relationship work might come 
in the form of international environmental treaties and WTO disputes. 
Whether the WTO retains its bias towards trade liberalization or moves to 
adopt greater environmental responsibility and justice frames the current 
debate about the future of this complex linkage between trade and the 
environment. 
B. WTO Agreements and Case Law Concerning Environmental Protection 
WTO Agreements are not merely focus on trade liberalization, they also 
consider environmental protection. Environmental considerations are 
incorporated into: the preamble of the WTO Agreement;24 Article 20(b)(g) 
of the GATT;25 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement);26 and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement).27 Like other WTO rulings, the Appellate Body Report in 
Shrimp-Turtle affirmed that the WTO Agreement explicitly recognizes the 
objective of sustainable development. 28  The Appellate Body Report also 
recognized the important social dimension of sustainable development.29 In 
the EC-Tariff Preferences, the WTO Appellate Body Report referred to its 
report in Shrimp-Turtle and affirmed that sustainable development is a goal 
of the WTO.30                                                                                                                                 
 22.  Goff, supra note 5, at 2. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, at 154. 
 25.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947, 60 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, (stipulating exceptions for measures that are: “(b) necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”). 
 26.   See WTO, Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
(May 1998), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) 
(dealing with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures to ensure food safety and to protect human, animal, 
and plant health based on the scientific principles and sufficient scientific evidence).  
 27.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Art 2, Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
(serving to consider environmental protection). 
 28.   Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 129, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998). 
 29.   Id. 
 30.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 94, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).  
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When the WTO interpreted its agreements to settle environmentally-
related trade disputes, the WTO panels and Appellate Body illustrated the 
controversy of free trade and the environment. Shrimp–Turtle is the most 
recognized case to interpret Article 20 of the GATT. The Appellate Body 
Report explained that, although the contested measure aimed for 
environmental protection under Article 20(g) of the GATT, the measure 
unjustifiably discriminated between WTO members. Thus, the US 
environmental measures in the Shrimp Turtle case contradicted the criteria of 
the chapeau of Article 20 of the GATT.31 
According to WTO case law, the WTO Appellate Body should not apply 
Article 20 exceptions to the GATT’s substantive rules. Specifically, these 
exceptions would frustrate or defeat a person’s GATT rights. However, the 
WTO Appellate Body requires reasonable application of trade measures to 
qualify for an exception. The chapeau—the terms of the headnote—of 
Article 20 is key to determine whether a measure qualifies. WTO case law 
implies environment-related trade measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between WTO members will not comply with the WTO rules.32  
II. THE ROLE OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION IN ASIA-PACIFIC 
The Doha Round in 2001 represented a milestone in reconciling trade 
liberalization and the environment within the WTO. Doha announced the 
declaration to support environmental protection in multilateral trade 
liberalization.33 Paragraph 31 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly 
states how this declaration is a significant step towards a positive relationship 
between free trade and environmental concerns.34 Nevertheless, the Doha                                                                                                                                 
 31.   Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, supra note 28, at ¶ 186.  
 32.   Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, 1, 141–43, WT/DS412/AB/R (May 6, 2013) (holding that Canada’s Micro Feed-In 
Tarff Program is inconsistent with WTO principles). 
 33.   World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001). 
 34.  See id. ¶31 (“With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and 
environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on: 
 
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set 
out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be 
limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties 
to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of 
any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question; 
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and 
the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status;  
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Round did not resolve environmental issues with trade liberalization.35The 
obstacle resulted from WTO members’ attempts to reconcile the interests of 
developed and developing countries. To solve this deadlock, members in the 
WTO negotiated bilateral and regional trade agreements.36  
Article 24 of the GATT, Article 5 of the GATS, and the enabling clause 
stipulate the legal basis to establish customs unions or free trade areas outside 
of the WTO.37 The impact of regional economic integration schemes outside 
of the WTO is widely debated. “Friends of the WTO” view these schemes as 
complementary building blocks of multilateral free trade. However, “foes of 
the WTO” claim that these types of preferential trade arrangements form 
exclusive trade blocs that will eventually impair trade multilateralism and 
become “stumbling blocks.”38                                                                                                                                  
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services. 
 
We note that fisheries subsidies form part of the negotiations provided for in paragraph 28.”). 
 35.  Mark Halle, Trade and Environment: Looking Beneath the Sands of Doha?, 3 J. EUR. 
ENVTL. & PLAN. L. 107, 109 (2006); see generally WTO Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the Doha 
Round of Negotiations, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/143 (Nov. 22, 2005) (including the Doha Round 
objectives, such as trade and intellectual property, trade and development, and trade and investment). 
 36.  See generally Regional Trade Agreements, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (evolving 
RTAs in the world showed a significant growth of RTAs in force after 2008. In 2008, 35 RTAs were in 
force). 
 37.   See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 24, July 1986 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (“[T]he provisions of 
this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area . . . : (a) with 
respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties 
and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in 
respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable 
in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, 
as the case may be; (b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation 
of a free trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent 
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement 
to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be 
higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the 
same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case 
may be.”); see also General Agreement on Trade In Services, art. 5, Jan. 1995, (“This Agreement shall 
not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in 
services between or among the parties to such an agreement. . . .”); see also Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (“Regional 
or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction 
or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products 
imported from one another.”).  
 38.  SUN-TAIK HAN, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE IMPACT ON ASIAN NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALISING ECONOMIES 29 (OECD 1992).   
2019] Asia-Pacific Governance of Trade and the Environment 9 
    
The factors supporting regional economic integration are as follows. 39 
First, regional preferential arrangements could help sustain intra-regional 
momentum for multilateral trade liberalization. 40  Moreover, regional 
preferential arrangements could act as a model for the initial processes of 
significant trade liberalization. Second, regional economic integration will 
increase the opportunity cost if countries maintain trade barriers vis-à-vis 
third parties. To the extent that integration arrangements make the partner 
countries more competitive, regional economic integration could reduce 
green protectionism between partner countries. This may open partner 
countries’ markets to external producers and drive access to non-partner 
countries.41 Last, third parties will try to negotiate bilateral reduction of trade 
barriers to gain access to the regional market. Third parties will put greater 
force behind multilateralism to undercut the partner countries’ preferences. 
Additionally, countries might resort to second-best preferential trade 
arrangements for practical reasons. For instance, the free-rider, least-
common-denominator, and “convoy” problems have been stressed in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 42  Despite the constraints that the most-
favored-nation clause and a multilaterally-negotiated-trade agenda imposes 
on the scope, depth, and pace of the negotiations, there are benefits to 
regional economic integration. 
Counter arguments against regional economic integration claim that 
regional preferential trade arrangements may result in trade blocs without 
further benefiting multilateral free trade.43 First, regional preferential trade 
arrangements may help generate regional champions. 44  This can create 
problems concerning interventionist policies associated with the standard 
concepts of strategic trade policy. Moreover, regional economic integration 
may cripple the free trade coalitions. Multilateral liberalization will 
eventually disintegrate member countries’ preferential trade treatment 
because advances from further liberalization will be marginal and will leave                                                                                                                                 
 39.  Id. at 30. 
 40.  See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Integration and Economic Development, 1965 U. Ill. 
L. F. 781, 811 (1965) (supporting integration of economic co-operation for developing countries to 
expand intra-regional and extra-regional trade).  
 41.  Lolette Kritzinger-van Niekerk, Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, 
Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience 2, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/Kritzinger.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).  
 42.  See generally RICHARD G. LIPSEY & MURRAY SMITH, MULTILATERAL VERSUS 
REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS: SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLIMENTS 10 (Simon Fraser Univ. Dep’t 
of Econ. Working Paper No. 10–03, 2010) (arguing that developed countries’s negotiations are slow 
moving because of the free-rider problem, non-tariff barriers to trade, and the “convoy” problem). 
 43.   Anne O. Krueger, Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or 
Protectionist?, 13 J. ON ECON. PERSPECTIVES 105, 119–120 (1999). 
 44.   Id. at 119.   
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regional groups with less impetus for multilateral free trade.45 Last, recent 
efforts to formulate regional preferential trade arrangements are partly 
motivated from frustration with GATT’s multilateral trade negotiations. 
These negotiations can be interpreted to mean that regional economic 
integration arrangements are not complementary, but rather substitutive for 
the multilateral approach to trade liberalization.46 
Free trade agreements (FTAs)47 in the Asia-Pacific proliferated after the 
financial crisis of 1997.48 In response to the crisis, affected states adopted 
FTAs to stimulate their economies and recover from financial loss. Professor 
and economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, argues that a “Spaghetti Bowl Effect” 
occurred when FTAs proliferated in Asia-Pacific.49 The “Spaghetti Bowl 
Effect” describes when products are discriminated against based on 
respective “nationality,” which Bhagwati asserts tarnishes trade. Trade 
experts have long noted these unpreventable costs.50 
The “Spaghetti Bowl Effect” has both benefits and disadvantages. 
Benefits include cooperation and competition of market access among states. 
Economists, including Krugman, Frankel, Stein, and Wei, concur that the 
incremental FTAs can create trade flows. 51  Disadvantages include trade 
diversion and increased business transaction costs.52 Since early FTAs in 
Asia-Pacific did not focus on economic growth, business costs in turn 
increased in subsequent FTAs.53 These disadvantages threaten to complicate                                                                                                                                 
 45.   See id. (arguing that previous experiences show that regional economic integration 
entities rarely initiated further multilateral free trade policies.) 
 46.  HAN, supra note 38, at 29. 
 47.  Please note that FTAs in this article directly mean and are restricted to bilateral FTAs.  
 48.  See APEC FTAs Database, APEC SECRETARIAT (2016), http://fta.apec.org (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2019) (showing that only four FTAs were signed before 1997, the majority came after). 
 49.  See Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs, 726 COLUM. U. 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, 1,4–5, 20 (Apr. 1995) (discussing the negative effects on trade from 
preferential trading agreements). 
 50.  Id. at 4. 
 51.  See generally Paul Krugman, Is Bilateralism bad? 1, 2–4, 12, 14–15, 17–18 (Nat’l 
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2972, 1989) (noting how internalizing trade within a 
country can devastate global trade overall, so incremental FTAs will avoid this situation); Paul 
Krugman, The move toward free trade zones, in Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones 7-42, 
Symposium (The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, WY, Aug. 1991); see also 
Jeffrey A. Frankel, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM 229 (1997) 
(discussing that regional FTAs are preferable but more needs to be done so that outside members get the 
benefit of the trading bloc); see also Shang-Jin Wei & Jeffery A. Frankel, Open Regionalism in a World 
of Continental Trade Blocs, 45 IMF Staff Papers 440, 441 (1998) (noting that continental trade blocs are 
more adapted to be welfare improving). 
 52.  See State of the Region Report 2006, Section 2: Regional Dynamics: Challenges for Asia 
Pacific Cooperation, PAC. ECON. COOPERATION COUNCIL, https://www.pecc.org/state-of-the-region-
report-2006/224-state-of-the-region/2006-2007/393-section-2-regional-dynamics-challenges-for-asia-
pacific-cooperation (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (describing positives and negatives of regional integration). 
 53.  Deborah Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: The Challenges of Unraveling the 
Noodle Bowl, 18 INT’L NEGOT.  25, 29 (2013).  
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the international trade system and fracture WTO law. Its preamble designates 
trade liberalization and a non-discriminatory, multilateral trading regime as 
its principle objectives.54 According to one analysis, RTAs demonstrate a 
broad range of environmental provisions in comparison to WTO 
agreements.55 For example, many RTA preambles recognize the necessity of 
protecting the environment, as such they emphasize the importance of 
sustainable development during trade liberalization.56 
One of the major differences between WTO agreements and RTAs are 
their institutional structures. Environmental measures are incorporated into 
various WTO agreements. These measures and discussions are also 
addressed in the Committee on Trade and Environment. Nevertheless, in 
several RTAs, environmental provisions can only be found in a separate 
environmental agreement on cooperation. 57  Several RTAs that did not 
originally contain specific environmental provisions created separate 
protocols or instruments to deal with environmental issues and problems in 
general.58 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF APEC 
Over the past decade, countries in the Asia Pacific region liberalized their 
trade policies by unilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches. In practice, 
countries have also undertaken trade liberalization through regional forums, 
such as APEC, and prospects remain positive for continued trade 
liberalization in the region.59 
Asia Pacific regionalism is an intricate phenomenon. It entails regional 
integration, which leads to considerable interdependence across the region. 
Regionalism may be market-driven or policy-led, whereas regional 
integration features interaction through economic activities and non-
economic channels. Regional integration also involves regional cooperation 
through official activities. These activities are conducive to regional 
integration because they contribute to cross-border coordination, plans, and                                                                                                                                 
 54.  Sustainable Development, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/sust_dev_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).  
 55.  Ronald Steenblik & Cristina Tebar Less, Chapter 9: Environment, in REGIONALISM 
AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 139 (OECD 2003). 
56.  See generally North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Jan. 1, 1994; see 
European Economic Area (EEA) Jan. 1, 1994; see Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (P4), July 18, 2005. 
57.  See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; see also Environment Cooperation Agreement Among the Parties to the Trans-
Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4), July 18, 2005. 
58.  Steenblik & Less, supra note 55, at 139. 
59.   EAST ASIA: RECOVERY AND BEYOND, WBG, 53–55 (May 2000).   
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response to problems. Such activities include “intergovernmental dialogue, 
information exchanges, provision of regional public goods, and regional 
institution building.”60  
Market force has been considered the most important drive in the 
regional development in Asia-Pacific. 61  The essence of the Asia Pacific 
market might lie in trade, and particularly depend on the export-led 
industrialization strategy in the region.62 Regional economic integration in 
Asia-Pacific is determined by the nature of legal and institutional frameworks 
through the coordination among countries. APEC is the current regional 
institution in the Asia Pacific rim. It was established in 1989, just five years 
before the WTO was established in 1994. APEC has twenty-one members 
operating based on their voluntary scheme. APEC is an emerging regional 
economic integration and consists of most countries in the Pacific Rim, 
including dominant and emerging economic powers.63 The map of APEC-
member economies is in figure 1.  
                                                                                                                                
60.  Roda Mushkat, Creating Regional Environmental Governance Regimes: Implications of 
Southeast Asian Responses to Transboundary Haze Pollution, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & 
ENV’T. 103, 111 (2013) (citing ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN REGIONALISM: A PARTNERSHIP FOR 
SHARED PROSPERITY XIL (2008) (discussing Asia’s regionalism and specifically ASEAN’s framework 
for regional cooperation).  
61.   See Zhang Zhiyoung, Economic Integration in East Asia: The Path of Law, 4 PEKING 
U. J. LEGAL STUD. 262, 264–265 (2013) (discussing market forces driving economic cooperation).  
62.  See South-East Asia Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation, UNDP (Aug. 
2006), http://www.asia-
pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/human_development/RBAP-
HDR-2006-SEA-Regional-Economic-Integration.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (discussing that 
governmental intervention by the Republic of Korea and Taiwan succeeded in stimulating economic 
benefits).   
63.  See Member Economies, supra note 7 (listing the participating countries in the Pacific 
Rim).  
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Figure 1: Map of APEC Member Economies 
 
 
Different from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a 
formal FTA with binding effects on the signing parties, and the EU, a 
common market carrying regulatory measures and legal institutions and 
orders, APEC was established as a less rigid forum and was more a grouping 
of diverse economies. APEC was established in 1989 in Canberra, Australia 
with twelve members; 64  there was a risk that it would be viewed as a 
“vacuous talk-shop.”65 Yet, APEC pursues the concept of open regionalism66 
and possesses unique features that make it economically and geopolitically 
significant. For instance, APEC offers a transregional dialogue platform for 
East and Southeast Asia, North and South America, and the Pacific.  
APEC started with a modest program of sectoral and trade negotiations. 
Its objectives reflect the desire of its founding members: to promote 
economic growth, foster and strengthen trade, counter terrorism, and improve                                                                                                                                 
 64.  See Our Work With APEC, N.Z. FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/our-work-with-apec/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (listing the founding 
members: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States). 
 65.  JEFFREY A. FRANKEL ET AL, APEC AND REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 
PACIFIC 1 (1994). 
 66.  Despite the various arguments of open regionalism, whether the proliferation of regional 
economic integration schemes will lead to closed or open regionalism may be influenced by the levels of 
microeconomic or macroeconomic. Regarding the microeconomic level, it will be influenced by the 
success in coping with structural adjustment problems with the blocs, and the commitment and willingness 
of the participating countries to confront the demands for protection and to seek multilateral trade 
liberalization. On the macroeconomic level, it is determined by the restoration of trade balances among 
the major trading partners and economic growth of the regions as well as the world. The micro and 
macroeconomic factors have a linkage about that protectionist demands tend to increase when the regional 
economy is suffering from inactive growth and increasing trade loss. HAN, supra note 38, at 30.  
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living standards.67 “While APEC has been criticized for its talk-shop nature, 
its high-profile dialogue has strengthen APEC’s relevance in global 
governance.” 68 With regard to its institutional structure, APEC does not 
contain an organizational structure or a large bureaucracy supporting it. 
There is only the APEC Secretariat located in Singapore, which includes 
twenty-three diplomats seconded from APEC-member economies.  
APEC consists of three main pillars: (1) trade and investment 
liberalization; (2) trade facilitation; and (3) economic and technical 
cooperation.69 The annual meeting of APEC leaders, held in the U.S.A. since 
1993, became a significant feature of APEC. Only one year after the 1993 
meeting, APEC leaders created another historic step at their meeting in 
Bogor, Indonesia. The Bogor declaration set a goal of creating the world’s 
largest area of free trade and investment by 2020. 70  Under this plan, 
developed economies would achieve free trade by the year 2010 and 
developing economies would follow in 2020. 71  The Bogor goals have 
influenced APEC’s Economic Leaders’ Meeting as well as the domestic 
economic policies of the member economies. But APEC has functioned as a 
de facto institution, lacking an establishment treaty conferring international 
legal personality. Therefore, it has suffered a severe credibility crisis because 
of “its failure to achieve ‘Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL),’ 
compounded by its inability to assist member economies during the Asian 
financial crisis in the 1990s.”72  
This failure has been attributed to several reasons. One major reason was 
the diverse economic scales of the APEC’s twenty-one member economies. 
These created obstacles for economic integration. 73  The developed 
countries—U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand—believed EVSL was 
another scheme aimed at reducing tariffs. 74  However, the developing 
countries, including China and a few members of ASEAN, claimed that 
EVSL should include measures of trade facilitation, technical assistance, and                                                                                                                                 
67.  Mission Statement, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION http://www.apec.org/About-
Us/About-APEC/Mission-Statement (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
68.  Pasha Hsieh, Reassessing APEC’s Role as A Trans-Regional Economic Architecture: 
Legal and Policy Dimensions, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 119 (2013). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Bogor Declaration, Nov. 15, 1994, APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common 
Resolve, http://thetechnocratictyranny.com/PDFS/1994_Declaration_Bogor_Goals.pdf (last visited Mar. 
9, 2019). 
 71.  1994 Leaders’ Declaration, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (Nov. 16, 1994), 
https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1994/1994_aelm.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).  
 72.  Hsieh, supra note 68. 
73.  Id. 
74.  See Id. (discussing how developed countries initiated EVSL to lower tariffs).   
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economic cooperation. 75  This conflicting understanding and support 
regarding the EVSL brought about difficulties in the process of deciding 
which sectors the EVSL should implement.76 
A. APEC’s Function in Protecting the Environment 
John Davis believed that regional economic organizations could create a 
forum for countries that lack a shared rule of law for cross-border issues, and 
thus make it possible for the countries in the region to address the severe 
environmental problems that they face together.77 In fact, the APEC has been 
criticized for neither effectively promoting the agenda of trade nor that of the 
environment and for failing to deal with the environmental problems.78 It 
functions as an open and voluntary forum with a shortage of strong political 
will; “[b]ecause of the difficulty in mobilizing political will to develop 
norms, APEC’s environmental activities in this period tended to focus on 
information and capacity building.”79 Without the solid political power and 
talk, it is difficult to efficiently solve the environmental problems through 
international trade. 80  Additionally, many issues involve just as many 
environmental disputes as scientific controversies. Some issues at stake 
within environmental disputes are irreversible effects of indeterminate 
activities, boundaries, and costs. The notion and definition of public interest 
is also difficult to answer. Consequently, environmental disputes are 
complicated to resolve.81  
Theory indicates that “institutions for managing transboundary 
environmental resources are more effective with their focus on the promotion                                                                                                                                 
75.  Id.; Mushkat, supra note 60, at 111 
76.   Glossary, ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (2018) http://www.apec.org/Glossary 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (“EVSL was based on the principle of voluntarism and the establishment of 
mutually beneficial packages. In 1997, APEC discussed the implementation of the EVSL in 15 potential 
sectors to positively influence trade, investment and economic growth in both of the individual APEC 
members and the region. However, EVSL failed because of major conflicts between the participants. The 
two essential factors – financial crisis of 1997-1998 in East Asia and domestic resistance and lobbying - 
both decelerated trade liberalization in the affected economies. Currently, Chemicals and Automotive in 
the EVSL are still being promoted under the APEC Industrial Dialogues.”).  
77.  Davis, supra note 2, at 80. 
78.   See Lyuba Zarsky, APEC, Globalization and the “Sustainable Development Agenda”, 
NAUTILUS INST. FOR SEC. AND SUSTAINABILITY (1998) (discussing APECs dismal record in negotiating 
environmental treaties alongside trade).  
79.  NATHAN BADENOCH, TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 19 (World Resources Institute 2002). 
80.  Astrid Fritz Carrapatoso, Environmental Aspects in Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-
Pacific Region, 6 AEJ 229, 241 (2008). 
81.   Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute 
Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 333–334 (1980).   
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of principles rather than enforcement.”82 In the 1990s, APEC attempted to 
enhance environmental protection results by adopting non-binding norms of 
environmental governance.83 The non-binding governing scheme, however, 
failed in such a sensitive area as environmental protection.84 Apart from 
APEC, other methods of regional environmental governance in Asia-Pacific, 
such as ADB, IDB, and AIIB, all carry limited institutional capacity (lack of 
technical expertise, insufficient funding, and fragmented institutional 
arrangements). 85  Moreover, critics observe that these institutions can be 
“frustratingly bureaucratic,” which may prevent them from successfully 
integrating environmental standards into institution policies.86 
Further analysis of this experience suggests four main tasks for regional 
institutions in improving the interface between the environment and 
economic development: (1) developing a shared vision of norms and goals; 
(2) building capacity at the regional level to monitor implementation and 
raise performance; (3) policy coordinating; and (4) developing effective 
institutions to implement policy. 87  Additionally, Karapinar proposed 
alternatives that could achieve objectives of environmental protection, such 
as regulatory mechanisms that impose stricter environmental standards on 
production, pollution charges directly based on the polluter pays principle, 
and promotion of cleaner and more efficient technologies.88  
B. Future Goals and Limitations 
There are many factors affecting the development of environmental 
protection in Asia-Pacific. One major factor is the backgrounds of countries                                                                                                                                 
82.  BADENNOCH, supra note 79, at 19 (citing Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, 
Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91(1) AME. J. OF INT’L 
L. 26–59 (1997)). 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  See Hongying Wang, New Multilateral Development Banks: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Global Governance, 8 GLOBAL POL’Y 113, 116 (2017) (“The leniency of the new 
[regional banks] toward infrastructure projects that may have negative social and environmental 
consequences could make them more attractive to some borrowers, who prioritize faster and lower-cost 
financing. This could undermine the ability of other [regional banks], including the World Bank, to 
uphold their standards.”). 
86.  Jisan Kim, Regulating Economic Development: Environmental and Social Standards of 
the AIIB and the IFC, HARV. INT’L L. J., (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/04/regulating-
economic-development-environmental-and-social-standards-of-the-aiib-and-the-ifc/ (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).  
87.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 19 (citing Lyuba Zarsky, Environmental Norms in the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, in Commitment and Compliance 310 (D. Shelton ed., 2000). 
 88.  Baris Karapinar, Export Restrictions and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, 
SWISS NAT’L CTR. OF COMPETENCE IN RES., (June 19, 2012), 
https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/c0/43/c0435cce-7f87-4a17-a78f-8b94bd7450d1/karapinar-
export_restrictions-190612-fin.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).  
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within Asia-Pacific are extremely diverse, i.e. from developed countries, 
including globally-dominant economic powers, to developing countries. Due 
partly to this, there was a resulting gap among the countries in implementing 
environmental policies. For example, while Western countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. intensively regulate environmental 
policy in international trade law, Asian countries appear to only passively 
consider the green impacts of the FTAs they negotiated.89 Such an outcome 
might be due to various considerations ranging from socio-economic to 
cultural and political perspectives. 90 For instance, issues of trade and 
environmental linkage are generally incorporated into the agenda only when 
Western countries–rather than Asian countries–lead FTA negotiations.91 
Another significant reason preventing the Asia-Pacific from moving 
towards a better integration of trade and environmental protection is the 
Asian countries’ fear of green protectionism.92 In other words, the Asian 
countries are concerned that environmental policy would become a trade 
barrier and a legal justification for the trade protection of the developed 
countries.93  
Given this fear of green protectionism, it is likely that the adoption of 
environmental policy as a legal ground for prohibiting trade imports will 
result in a cautious approach to the issue of environmental exceptions from 
trade restrictions in a number of Asia-Pacific countries. 94  This cautious 
approach ultimately will influence the process of how environmental policy 
is dealt with in the FTAs in Asia-Pacific.95  
Practically, for instance, New Zealand has successfully incorporated 
environmental issues in its trade negotiation agenda and made solutions that 
are acceptable to all its trade negotiating members.96   
As a result, there is a gap amongst the countries in Asia-Pacific in 
implementing environmental policies.97 While developed countries typically 
have greater environmental regulations, developing countries fear that such 
regulations would impede their development of trade because developed 
countries would use the environmental regulations as trade protectionism. 
Important legal questions arise from this situation: would all the solutions                                                                                                                                 
89.  Carrapatoso, supra note 80, at 230. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  DOUGLAS H. BROOKS, CHALLENGES FOR ASIA’S TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 18 
(1998). 
93.  Gueye Kamal & Kenichi Imai, Harmonizing Trade and Environment in Recent Free 
Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region, 4 INT’L REV. FOR ENVL. STRAT. 265, 272 (2003).  
94.     Id. at 274. 
95.  Id.  
96.  Carrapatoso, supra note 80, at 237. 
97.     Id. at 230.   
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that aim to tackle the deadlock of trade and the environment turn out to be 
mere rhetoric?98 Do they have a real impact on the trade scheme concerning 
the environmental protection policy?99 FTAs represent the opportunity to 
bridge these difficulties and to strengthen cooperation for environmental 
protection through trade schemes.100 The next section focuses on why FTAs 
are needed as a tool to protect the environment. Furthermore, in Asia-Pacific, 
an RTA is, and will be, significant in the protection of the environment. 
IV. RTA’S SIGNIFICANCE IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE 
STUDY OF CPTPP’S ENVIRONMENTAL CHAPTER 
A. RTA’s Significance in Protecting the Environment 
Since environmental problems have transboundary effects, unilateral 
trade measures responding to the common failure to protect the environment 
are not adequate solutions.101 FTAs are recognized as an important economic 
instrument to connect trade and the environment because of their inter-
reliance and cooperation between countries.102 FTAs deal extensively with 
non-tariff barriers to trade as well.103 According to the 2012 report from the 
United Nations Conference on Development and Trade, “non-tariff measures 
contribute much more than tariffs to overall trade restrictiveness.” 104 
However, since FTAs reduce border barriers among signing states, there will 
be increased substitution, by means of compensation, to non-tariff barriers to 
trade. 105  Pursuing deeper integration among FTA members is, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                
98.   Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Panel Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
¶ 9.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998) (arguing that the best way for parties to contribute 
to achieving WTO objectives is through cooperative agreements that account for the specific conditions 
in the geographical areas concerned). 
101.  Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal 
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 491 (2002).  
102.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, supra note 30, at footnote 107. See also, JACQUES BOURGEOIS ET AL., A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, 4 (2007), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138103.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) 
(analyzing empirical evidence how FTAs relate to, among other things, trade and the environment).  
103.  KENNETH HEYDON & STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, THE RISE OF BILATERALISM: COMPARING 
AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND ASIAN APPROACHES TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 47 (United 
Nations University Press 2009) (analogizing free trade agreements with preferential trade agreements). 
104.   MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, 135, 138, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).   
 105.  HEYDON & WOOLCOCK, supra note 103, at 47.  
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likely to reduce reliance on non-tariff barriers to trade.106 Hence, regional 
integration is the utmost goal among signing parties of FTAs. 
 The harmonization of environmental standards and regulations in the 
regional integration tends to differ based on whether the region’s members 
expect economic integration or merely trade facilitation.107 A few RTAs 
include areas that have gone beyond the WTO, consisting of provisions 
preventing relaxation of domestic environmental laws and enforcement of 
those laws, which define the relationship between multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) and the RTAs, and require each party to periodically 
prepare (and make publicly available) a report on the state of its 
environment.108 
 Author, Wen-chen Shih, argues that the Asia-Pacific’s broad position on 
environmental protection issues is “unsatisfactory and conservative.” 109 
Shih, therefore, emphasizes the role of a regional institution in establishing 
regional environmental laws and regulations, which would promote 
harmonization. 110  However, we have not seen a binding regional 
environmental regulation system in Asia-Pacific.111 In theory, an effective 
approach for “addressing transboundary environmental harm would establish 
a system that connects international policymaking with national 
implementation.”112 The advantages of a regional environmental institution 
include a harmonized standard that can be predicted and then contribute to a 
stable development of environmental law. Furthermore, having regional 
environmental governance would lead to a secured agreement for, and 
implementation of, an action for coping with environmental problems.113 
After the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the TPP on 
January 23, 2017, the most recent development of a mega RTA in the region 
is the CPTPP.114 Its predecessor was the TPP signed on February 6, 2016, 
and had, in effect, enlarged the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement (SEP) that concluded in 2006 among four countries: Brunei                                                                                                                                 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Steenblik and Less, supra note 55, at 139. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Wen-chen Shih, Trade and Environment Linkages and Challenges Facing East Asian 
WTO Members, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 157, 187 (2006). 
 110.  Id.  
111.   Id. at 170. 
112.  Lian & Robinson, supra note 1, at 102. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Memorandum from the U.S. Trade Representative on Withdrawal of the U.S. from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019); see also What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL., (last updated May 15, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (last visited Mar. 9, 
2019).  
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Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.115 In 2008, the U.S. led 
TPP “trade talks” after its accession to the SEP. 116 Since then, this mega 
RTA has drawn a lot of attention and is topical both in the WTO law 
scholarship and in the public.117 Compared to the existing FTAs in the region, 
the CPTPP includes an unprecedented range and scope of chapters in its 
agreement. The environmental chapter in the CPTPP is considered a golden 
standard among trade deals.118 
B. Theory of Regional Environmental Governance 
Regardless of the deadlock of the linkage between trade liberalization 
and environmental protection at a multilateral level,119 an RTA pertaining to 
regional environmental governance is essential for dealing with 
transboundary environmental harm. 120  Two of the most noticeable 
advantages from connected governance are minimized complexity and 
hierarchy, as well as facilitating boot-up and delivery times.121 As a result, 
well-functioning regional environmental governance is necessary for Asia-
Pacific. 
Since national-level institutions normally have failures in these particular 
areas 122  and fail to integrate environmental issues, the environment has 
suffered. Therefore, the need is pressing for establishing regional governance 
that maintains a sufficiently wide perspective. Yet, even though others would 
argue for autonomy of national governments, the impact of regional 
governance over politics, economics, and the environment has occurred at a 
striking pace. 123 
With regard to creating regional environmental governance, some 
suggest that regional institutions that directly represent national governments 
and interests (e.g. the ASEAN) operate more effectively due to their direct 
link with national processes shaping governmental interactions. 124  Yet,                                                                                                                                 
115.   Id.  
116.   Id.  
117.  Elms, supra note 53, at 29. 
118.  Jay Chittooran, TPP in Brief: Environmental Standards (Apr. 15, 2016), 
http://www.thirdway.org/memo/tpp-in-brief-environmental-standards (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
119.  See discussion infra Section II. 
120.  See Lian & Robinson, supra note 1, at 102 (discussing the regional level is where states 
can collaborate to solve ecosystem problems).   
121.   Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. Ivanova, Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance: A 
Function-Driven Approach, 3 INDIAN. J. ENVL L. 38, 50 (2002). 
122.   See id. (recognizing networked governance and not national-level institutions have 
strength in boot-up and delivery times).  
123.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 9. 
124.   See Le Thac Can et al., Environmental Governance in Vietnam in a Regional Context, 
http://pdf.wri.org/mekong_goverance_mreg_canphanan.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (discussing  
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others argue that the interaction of such institutions, along with the specific 
integration associated with each national actor, offers a large forum on which 
environmental governance reform can be addressed.125 
Therefore, intensive institutional components may result in more 
effective governance of transboundary environmental issues. 126  A good 
example is the wide range of institutions with overlapping, complementary 
mandates and multiple channels of communication and accountability. 
Moreover, the direction this institutional interplay takes is largely determined 
by the structures and practices of governance and the decision-making 
process.127 The principles of the Rio Declaration considerably defined the 
conditions and principles for multilateral environmental governance. 128 
These principles include access to information, participation in decision-
making, and accountability in environmental matters.129 Other principles in 
international environmental law, such as the precautionary principle, are also 
important components of environmental governance.130 “Implementation of 
these principles will require a thorough rethinking of the ways government 
interacts with society at large.”131 These three fundamental principles can 
provide guidance to analyze regional environmental governance because it 
can be suggested that these principles are important foundations for good 
governance. In addition, these principles can serve as catalysts for 
implementing other principles.  
                                                                                                                                
regional governments adopting environmental protection through public awareness and including decision 
makers).    
125.  See generally Kao Kim Hourn, The Impact of Regional Integration on the Governance 
Process in Cambodia: The Environmental Perspective, in Mekong Regional Environmental Governance 
Project: Perspectives on Opportunities and Challenges 5 (Nathan Badenoch, 2001) (arguing regional 
integration occurs in Cambodia and will continue to do so).   
126.  See BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 9 (citing Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Damming Troubled 
Waters, 1 Intermarium (1997)) (discussing how institutional overlap that mandates communication and 
accountability will result in more effective governance). 
127.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 9. 
128.  See Report of the U.N. Conf. on Envtl. Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] 
(identifying the goal of establishing international agreements for environmental protection).  
129.   See id. at 2-3 (discussing the role of the government in establishing accountability, 
public participation, and access to information).  
130.   See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12,1992) (discussing how states 
should use the precautionary approach to protect the environment and not delay environmental 
protection because of lack of scientific information or serious environmental threats).   
131.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 15 (citing ELENA PETKOVA & PETER VEIT, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AARHUS 
CONVENTION (World Resources Institute 2000)).  
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The first principle is transparency and access to information.132 This 
principle evaluates whether an institution provides the public with reliable, 
timely information concerning their operational policies and procedures. 
Additionally, this principle requires access to information concerning 
environmental status, trends for society, and potential environmental impacts 
assessments. Second, public participation is necessary regarding the 
representation and participation of the various interests in their decisions.133 
The final principle examines accountability. This principle examines whether 
there are mechanisms for institutions to be accountable to affected 
stakeholders across boundaries.134 
C. An Analysis of the CPTPP’s Environmental Chapter 
CPTPP’s environmental chapter is considered the high environmental 
standard in RTAs in the 21st century. The CPTPP is evaluated in this article 
to explore whether it is more advanced than the existing bilateral FTAs 
reinforcing environmental protection. 135  This article aims to provide the 
public with a thorough assessment of the positive and negative effects that 
CPTPP will have on the environment. Further, this article evaluates whether 
the CPTPP is a beneficial RTA in Asia-Pacific for environmental protection 
and governance. 
Because of the scope of environmental protection it covers, CPTPP’s 
environmental chapter is particularly novel in regional environmental 
governance in Asia-Pacific. Its environmental chapter covers and reflects the 
obligation derived from major Multilateral Economic Agreements (MEAs). 
Additionally, it provides original policies that aim to protect the oceans by 
an RTA. Moreover, the chapter has an environmental dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
Specifically, the issues focused on environmental obligations in the 
CPTPP’s chapter can be divided into four areas: maritime protection,                                                                                                                                 
132.   Michael Johnston, Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010193.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).  
133.   See id. at 5 (discussing the emphasis on participation in liberalized economies after 
transitions).  
134.  See BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 20 (discussing mechanisms to hold the government 
accountable to the public interest). 
135.   See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership, annex 20--A, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Feb. 4, 2016 (listing the 12 countries that signed the TPP in 2016–Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, U.S., and Vietnam). See also 
Letter from Maria Pagan, Acting United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President 
(Jan. 30, 2017) (on file at the Office of the United States Trade Representative) (announcing that the U.S. 
will not be legally bound to the agreement because they do not intend to become a party to the agreement). 
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reinforcing MEAs, overcoming illegal trade in wildlife and plant products, 
and promoting biodiversity.136 First, it offers original policies that aim to 
protect the oceans.137 The world’s most significant fish exporters are in some 
of the CPTPP parties. Additionally, the subsidies offered by some of the TPP 
parties created the overfishing issue.138 Therefore, owing to the innovation of 
the environmental chapter in the TPP, the provisions preserving the oceans 
can assist with mitigating fishery issues. The TPP environmental chapter 
restricts and attempts to promote sound management of fisheries subsidies.139 
Additionally, one of the TPP’s priorities is to counter illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing. This is accomplished by putting restrictions on 
unlawful trade of reaped fish and at-sea trans-shipment of such products.140 
Effective measures to combat IUU fishing requires international cooperation. 
The United Nations’s Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement of 2009 
(FAO) “on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU 
fishing,” mandates such cooperation.141 However, this measure has not yet 
entered into force. Although TPP members “endeavor to improve 
cooperation internationally,”142 the environmental chapter does not require 
its members to adopt and implement the 2009 FAO.  
                                                                                                                                
 136.   Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20, at 4, 
6, 12, 18, Feb. 2, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP].  
 137.  Jeffrey Schott, Chapter 3: TPP and the Environment, in 2 ASSESSING THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, INNOVATIONS IN TRADING RULES 32, 34 (Jeffrey Schott & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs 
eds., 2016).  
 138.  See id. (discusses how the TPP addresses the problem of subsidies causing adverse 
effects for fishing policies).  
139.  Id.  
140.   See id. at 35 (describing the TPP provision that bans subsidies to IUU fishing vessels). 
141.   Id. 
142.   See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20.12.1-20.12.3, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative (“1. The Parties recognize the importance of cooperation as a mechanism to 
implement this Chapter, to enhance its benefits and to strengthen the Parties’ joint and individual 
capacities to protect the environment and to promote sustainable development as they strengthen their 
trade and investment relations. 2. Taking account of their national priorities and circumstances, and 
available resources, the Parties shall cooperate to address matters of joint or common interest among the 
participating Parties related to the implementation of this Chapter, when there is mutual benefit from that 
cooperation. This cooperation may be carried out on a bilateral or plurilateral basis between Parties and, 
subject to consensus by the participating Parties, may include nongovernmental bodies or organizations 
and non-Parties to this Agreement. 3. Each Party shall designate the authority or authorities responsible 
for cooperation related to the implementation of this Chapter to serve as its national contact point on 
matters that relate to coordination of cooperation activities and shall notify the other Parties in writing 
within 90 days of the date of entry into force of this Agreement for that Party of its contact point. On 
notifying the other Parties of its contact point, or at any time thereafter through the contact points, a Party 
may: (a) share its priorities for cooperation with the other Parties, including the objectives of that 
cooperation; and (b) propose cooperation activities related to the implementation of this Chapter to 
another Party or Parties.”).   
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Second, the CPTPP requires combating the illegal take and trade in 
wildlife and wild plant products.143 The commitments under the TPP consist 
of postponing illegal harvest and trade in logging, wildlife, and plant 
products. Other commitments include having better cooperation to 
strengthen environmental management of these resources. MEAs, such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES), require this.144 The strongest obligations in the environmental 
chapter might pertain to the subject of conservation and trade. According to 
Article 20.17.2 in the TPP,145 each TPP party shall adopt, maintain, and 
implement laws, regulations, and any other measures to achieve its 
obligations under the CITES.                                                                                                                                 
143.   Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20.17.3, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. 
144.   Id. at art. 20.17:  
 
1. The Parties affirm the importance of combating the illegal take of, and illegal 
trade in, wild fauna and flora, and acknowledge that this trade undermines efforts 
to conserve and sustainably manage those natural resources, has social 
consequences, distorts legal trade in wild fauna and flora, and reduces the economic 
and environmental value of these natural resources.” 
2. Accordingly, each Party shall adopt, maintain and implement laws, regulations 
and any other measures to fulfil its obligations under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).  
3. The Parties commit to promote conservation and to combat the illegal take of, 
and illegal trade in, wild fauna and flora. To that end, the Parties shall: 
(a) exchange information and experiences on issues of mutual interest related to 
combating the illegal take of, and illegal trade in, wild fauna and flora, including 
combating illegal logging and associated illegal trade, and promoting the legal trade 
in associated products; 
(b) undertake, as appropriate, joint activities on conservation issues of mutual 
interest, including through relevant regional and international fora; and 
(c) endeavor to implement, as appropriate, CITES resolutions that aim to protect 
and conserve species whose survival is threatened by international trade. 
4. Each Party further commits to:  
(a) take appropriate measures to protect and conserve wild fauna and flora that it 
has identified to be at risk within its territory, including measures to conserve the 
ecological integrity of specially protected natural areas, for example wetlands; 
(b) maintain or strengthen government capacity and institutional frameworks to 
promote sustainable forest management and wild fauna and flora conservation, and 
endeavor to enhance public participation and transparency in these institutional 
frameworks; and 
(c) endeavor to develop and strengthen cooperation and consultation with interested 
non-governmental entities in order to enhance implementation of measures to 
combat the illegal take of and illegal trade in, wild fauna and flora. 
 
145.   See Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 20.17.2, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (“Accordingly, each Party shall adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regulations and 
any other measures to fulfill its obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).”).   
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Third, the MEAs and their obligations have been well covered and 
reflected in the TPP environmental chapter.146 It is worth addressing that the 
TPP parties’ participation in the MEAs varies widely. Article 20.4 affirms 
the basic commitment of each country “to implement the multilateral 
environmental agreements to which it is a party.” 147  This exemplary 
provision is intensified with language linked to specific MEAs. This adopted 
idea came from the US. The US intention was to ratify TPP provisions that 
would oblige members to pursue domestic policies and enforce MEA 
commitments where members were a party.148 If failing to do so, the country 
would breach CPTPP obligations and possibly make itself liable for a TPP 
dispute settlement. As a result, the aim was to better enforce existing MEA 
obligations where a country was already a member. Nevertheless, TPP’s 
approach to cover disciplines that reinforce CITES and other MEAs is not 
the best to prevent abusive environmental measures or unlawful trade.149 
“[T]he economic incentives to,” avoid “governmental measures are too 
lucrative,” for the summarized result in the CPTPP.150 However, the CPTPP 
provisions about compliance with the MEA obligations can have a huge 
impact.151 
The final area covered in the CPTPP environmental chapter regards 
biodiversity conservation. CPTPP parties have important objectives yet 
differing priorities concerning the use and protection of biological diversity. 
This can also be augmented with some provisions in the bilateral FTAs 
between some TPP parties. Article 20.13.2 in the TPP requires that each 
member “shall promote and encourage the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, in accordance with its law or policy.” 152  TPP 
environmental chapter also requires transparency of government programs 
and activities “related to the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity.”153 It also establishes commitments to cooperate on “the protection                                                                                                                                 
146.   See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20.4, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (recognizing that MEAs play an important role in environmental protection).  
147.   Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 20.4.1, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (“The Parties recognize that multilateral environmental agreements to which they are 
party play an important role, globally and domestically, in protecting the environment and that their 
respective implementation of these agreements is critical to achieving the environmental objectives of 
these agreements. Accordingly, each Party affirms its commitment to implement the multilateral 
environmental agreements to which it is a party.”). 
148.   See Schott, supra note 137, at 35 (discussing the value of the TPP in allowing domestic 
policies that discourage abuse).  
149.  Id. at 38. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
152.  The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 20.13.2 Trade and Biodiversity, Feb. 4, 
2016, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
153.   Id.  
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and maintenance of ecosystems” and “access to genetic resources and the 
sharing of benefits arising from their utilization.” 154  Lastly, this chapter 
recognizes the importance of “respecting, preserving and maintaining 
knowledge and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles . . . ”.155 
Overall, the CPTPP is unprecedented and the single, greenest free trade 
agreement. This is because of the important obligations addressed in the 
CPTPP’s environmental chapter, and because it pertains to a wide scope of 
the law that discourages abusive environmental practices. Despite these 
merits of the CPTPP’s environmental chapter, the CPTPP also faces 
criticisms. 
First, during its negotiation, environmental groups in the US protested 
the CPTPP as a fast track without any transparency and environmental 
consideration.156 Among all the environmental groups, the Sierra Club has 
offered several criticisms.157 Focusing on the weaker conservation language, 
the Sierra Club provided some of the suggested texts to be adopted in the 
CPTPP’s environmental chapter. 158  However, the final version of the 
environmental chapter does not reflect the suggested contents. For example, 
the Sierra Club suggested adopting the regulations the regional fishing 
management organization abided by in the CPTPP. However, the CPTPP 
fails to do so, and also fails to mention the regulations arising from the fishing 
MEAs, i.e. FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and 
Eliminate IUU fishing in 2009. 159  Another critical issue Sierra Club 
addressed regards the incorporation of effective enforcement of the rampant,                                                                                                                                 
154.   See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20.13.6, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
full-text (last visited Mar. 9, 2019), (“6. Consistent with Article 20.12 (Cooperation Frameworks), the 
Parties shall cooperate to address matters of mutual interest. Cooperation may include, but is not limited 
to, exchanging information and experiences in areas related to: (a) the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity; (b) the protection and maintenance of ecosystems and ecosystem services; and 
(c) access to genetic resources and the sharing of benefits arising from their utilization.”).  
155.   See The Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 20.13.3, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
full-text (last visited Mar. 9, 2019), (“The Parties recognize the importance of respecting, preserving and 
maintaining knowledge and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional 
lifestyles that contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”).  
156.   See TPP Text Analysis: Environment Chapter Fails to Protect the Environment, 
SIERRA CLUB (2015) 1,1 https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploads-
wysiwig/TPPanalysis.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (arguing the TPP negotiations do not meet the 
minimum required environmental protection). 
157.   TPP Text Analysis: Environmental Chapter Fails to Protect the Environment, SIERRA 
CLUB (2015), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploads-
wysiwig/TPPanalysis.pdf. (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).  
158.   Id.  
159.   Id. at 1.  
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widely-documented environmental violations. 160  Presumably, having 
effective enforcement should prevent the widely-documented environmental 
violations. 
A final concern is the absence of the climate change legal regime in the 
CPTPP.161 The CPTPP failed to adequately address the challenges to trade 
and economic growth posed by global warming. 162 While the CPTPP, a 
mega-regional free trade agreement, entails objectives of liberalizing trade in 
the Asia-Pacific area and facilitating regional economic integration, it has 
been subject to criticism in terms of considering the environment.163 In other 
words, since the fundamental value of free trade and environmental 
protection appear to be contradictory, the CPTPP is promising as a 
breakthrough development reconciling these two areas.164 Nonetheless, there 
might be severe environmental violations and threats that the CPTPP could 
cause. The governments in the CPTPP must ensure the consideration of 
environmental protection has been fully implemented. Further, more 
extensive prior assessments and environmental reviews need to be conducted 
as well. 
In conclusion, the CPTPP, as a regional level FTA, is expected to do 
more than the existing FTAs. Assessment of the CPTPP’s role in establishing 
regional environmental governance is in the following section. 
D. Improving the CPTPP for Better Environmental Governance in Asia-
Pacific 
According to research, the trends of economic, political, and 
environmental perspectives resulted in some changes in regional governance 
practices.165 These trends also resulted in progress  addressing transboundary 
environmental problems within the institutional structure. 166  While 
transboundary environmental problems have cross-border effects on the 
environment and affected countries, it is a significant motivator in 
establishing regional environmental governance. The Asia-Pacific rim has                                                                                                                                 
160.   Id.  
161.  Id. at 7. 
162.   Schott, supra note 137, at 39. 
163.   Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: For, Against and 
Prospects, E-INT’L REL., (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.e-ir.info/2016/04/13/the-trans-pacific-
partnership-for-against-and-prospects/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
164.   Overview and Benefits of the CPTPP, GOV’T OF CAN., (date modified June, 12, 2018), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-
ptpgp/overview-apercu.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).  
165.   Harriet Bulkeley & Michele Betsill, Rethinking Sustainable Cities: Multilevel 
Governance and the 'Urban' Politics of Climate Change, 14 ENVTL. POL. 42, 44, 47 (Feb. 2005).  
166.   BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 9.  
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abundant natural resources and has been an important in linking trade and the 
environment. Therefore, an RTA aimed for well-defined and functioning 
environmental governance is essential.  
Generally, RTAs play a key role in coordinating comparative advantages 
of each signing party through trade activities beyond bilateralism.167 This 
connecting and inter-reliable effect enhances opportunities for signing parties 
to cooperate in dealing with transboundary issues in a global world. 168 
Impacts from RTAs appear to exceed bilateral FTAs, as they involve more 
countries and the results of negotiations are more complex. To some extent, 
the results reflect the tension and intentions of signing parties to achieve a 
solution for some issues. Particularly in Asia-Pacific, RTAs can wield 
influence in sensitive areas, like protecting the environment.169 
Indeed, CPTPP covers many environmental issues. The belief is that 
linking these environmental issues to a broader range of political and 
economic cooperation trends can increase benefits received from 
environmental cooperation.170 This highlights the importance of intensive 
institutional cooperation. Furthermore, such cooperation is likely to refine 
environmental governance. 
Additionally, a broadly-defined environmental agenda can encourage the 
shift from a narrow focus on sectoral management to a more encompassing, 
process-oriented environmental governance. 171  The need for interaction 
across regional, national, and sub-national levels in transboundary 
environmental issues is particularly acute. 172  Additionally, in 2006, Shih 
addressed the challenge facing East Asian countries: the lack of a uniform 
position regarding the domestic environmental protection policies in the 
context of international trade. 173  Following this challenge, this article 
suggests the CPTPP be improved to restructure environmental institutions 
and the associated setups.                                                                                                                                 
167.   See HAN, supra note 38 (discussing how regional agreements can act as a model and 
help push for trade liberalism and increased investment). 
168.   See id. ("[R]egional integration arrangements makes the partner countries more 
competitive, it could make them less protectionist and thus more willing to open their markets to 
outsiders and to seek greater access to non-partner countries"). 
 169.   See id. at 7 (arguing that the impact of European economic integration on Asia-Pacific 
countries helps three ways: trade, foreign direct investment, and the world trading system).    
 170.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 23 (citing Aaron Wolf, Transboundary Waters: Sharing 
Benefits, Lessons Learned (2001) (“In the case of environmental governance gaps between the ASEAN 
countries and China, although institutions are not yet up to the region’s environmental challenges, 
increased political and economic cooperation has created a number of opportunities for bridging the 
gap.”). 
 171.  Id. at 22. 
172.  Id. 
173.   Shih, supra note 109, at 160110.  
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The CPTPP should incorporate, apart from the institutional setup, 
principles of international environmental law, developed from the Rio 
Declaration; environmental norms; and justice. Major principles, like the 
precautionary principle and environmental impact assessments, are important 
foundations and enshrine the significance of implementing effective 
governance.174 Badenoch thought regional institutions, in close collaboration 
with national governments, should develop a vision for and an approach to 
institutionalizing transboundary issues within environmental assessments, 
particularly environmental impact assessments.175 
Finally, effective regional environmental governance should adopt 
enforcement measures that ensure accountability. The CPTPP sets up an 
environmental dispute settlement mechanism, which covers a large scope of 
environmental issues. Still, the establishment of an appellate body and an 
assured rule of transparency can improve the mechanism. Specifically, it is 
necessary to enhance accountability of the governance. Effective public 
policy and management can enhance accountability if citizens can hold 
public officials and political delegates accountable for policy and 
performance.176 In this regard, East Asia has progressed more slowly than 
other regions in the world. However, many countries in the region have 
established the foundations for institutional accountability, such as important 
political liberalization.177 Increasing accountability may take several years 
and involves many related aspects of governance. Attempts to improve 
accountability must also be built into public management systems. Finally, 
performance evaluations and citizen–grievance processes are critical to 
ensure the accountability of the civil service.178 
CONCLUSION 
Unilateral trade measures aimed at environmental protection are not an 
adequate solution for environmental problems pertaining to transboundary 
issues.179 Further, the pending progress of the Doha Round, in the WTO, 
about linking free trade and environmental protection at a multilateral level 
                                                                                                                                
174.   U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), principle 15, 17 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
175.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 23. 
176.   Rio Declaration, supra note 128, at 2.  
177.  BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 20. 
178.  EAST ASIA: RECOVERY AND BEYOND, supra note 59, at 109.   
179.   Howse, supra note 101, at 491.  
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brought about the urgency of reconciling trade and the environment by means 
of bilateral or regional trade agreements.180  
Development of Asia-Pacific and its achievement of long-term social and 
economic goals depend on how well countries are governed. Governance in 
the region is undergoing profound change in response to new resource 
constraints and increased demands for accountability.181  
This article started with discussing the debate between free trade and 
environmental protection in terms of the scholarships and WTO Agreements 
and their disputes. This theoretical discussion demonstrated that free trade 
and environmental protection can be mutually beneficial. Under Article 
20(b)(g) of the GATT, environmental protection measures are recognized 
exceptions. However, WTO case law implies that if the measures 
discriminate in favor of principles of free trade, they violate WTO law.  
APEC’s failure to implement EVSL has left its environmental protection 
vulnerable. The Asia-Pacific region undoubtedly requires solid and binding 
regional environmental governance with regulatory effects. While there is a 
mutually beneficial relationship between trade and the environment, this 
article argues an RTA is necessary to establish environmental governance in 
Asia-Pacific. CPTPP and its environmental chapter is an unprecedented 
example in Asia-Pacific, and such an attempt to establish environmental 
governance has been recognized. However, its provisions of substance and 
process can be improved. The substantive issues in the CPTPP’s 
environmental chapter covers suggest the need to incorporate and implement 
the obligations of the MEAs into the agreement.182 Moreover, CPTPP does 
not mention the MEAs that are essential to the fisheries sector management 
in Asia-Pacific. The climate change legal regime is also not incorporated into 
the CPTPP.  
Apart from the substantive criticisms, the CPTPP is also criticized for its 
negotiation without transparent and appropriate monitoring.183 Regarding the 
procedural aspect and as shown by the range of outputs produced, an 
elaborate institutional infrastructure appears to work and function                                                                                                                                 
180.   See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration 14 Nov. 2001, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (recognizing the role of environmental protection in free 
trade agreements). 
181.  Elms, supra note 53, at 95. 
182.  See BADENOCH, supra note 79, at 19 (“Global norms [along with obligations] might be 
more relevant if they are modified and adapted to the region’s specific needs[]. Any approach to regional 
norms should be accompanied by a process of confidence and consensus building, with the objective of 
producing not only an acceptable framework but also mechanisms for implementation.”). 
183.   Jane Kelsey, Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Committee on the 
Revised Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership, 3–4 (Apr. 17, 2018) (on file with the University 
of Auckland, Faculty of Law).  
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adequately. 184  Nevertheless, doubts are continuously expressed about 
members’ strategic commitment, organizational robustness, and policy 
impact (a broader and more meaningful criterion than output). Additional 
research is needed to obtain a clearer picture of realities in this particular 
sphere and their theoretical ramifications.185 In addition,  the provisions of 
institutional and procedural arrangements in the TPP should pertain to the 
concept of transparency, since transparency plays an important role in 
enhancing regional governance. 
Regardless of those suggestions for the CPTPP’s environmental chapter, 
the first challenge the CPTPP parties encounter is the agreement’s future 
direction. After the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw, there was 
a negative view regarding the forthcoming dissolved CPTPP. If dominant 
economic power proceeds to exit from the CPTPP, international trade will 
move towards bilateralism and away from multilateralism. Nevertheless, 
Australia and Japan, two of the remaining parties, still maintain hope and 
advocate for the CPTPP’s importance and benefits for both economic 
integration and the region’s stability.  
This article has demonstrated the significance of RTAs in linking trade 
and the environment. Likewise, transboundary environmental problems 
require cooperation and governance at a regional level. In Asia-Pacific, this 
cooperative and governing scheme is particularly crucial, because of the 
common environmental problems countries face and their inter-reliance on 
each other for solving the environmental disputes. Presumably, if CPTPP 
eventually ceases function, what we could reasonably expect as an alternative 
is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is led 
by China and has some of the ASEAN countries involved. However, RCEP’s 
current negotiations do not show any concern for producing an 
environmental chapter. RCEP’s parties are also from diverse economic 
backgrounds, which will make negotiations equally complicated and slow in 
the process. Accounting for these challenges in implementing RTAs in Asia-
Pacific, the author claims since the sustainability of the environment is an 
urgent priority, government officials and policy makers must consider this 
issue and make cooperative policies between trade and the environment a 
practical reality. Once policy makers start demanding these cooperative 
policies, it will attract more attention to the necessity of an RTA with regional 
environmental governance and will increase the possibility of creating the 
agreement. 
                                                                                                                                 
184.   See generally, Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free Trade 
Agreements 2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4597, 1993) (explaining how to 
achieve FTA equilibrium to assess FTA efficiency). 
185.  Mushkat, supra note 60, 140. 
